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It is hardly news to read that promoting religion in America is a bit like 
marketing fast food, or that Madison Avenue tactics are not entirely out of place 
in the parsonage. Wasn't it behind the headlines lambasting the PTL (Praise the 
Lord) television ministry and the indiscretions of Jim and Tammy Baker? More 
recently, hasn't it been even more directly addressed in the various news reports 
on the so-called "megachurches"? And, hasn't Jon Butler, one of America's 
preeminent historians of religion, stated it emphatically, in The Economist no 
less, when he announced that there was "a national market in religion long before 
there was a national market in economics"?1 
It is difficult to explain why such a popular thesis has received so little 
scholarly attention, but now it has in two fine books on the subject, The Churching 
of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy by Roger 
Finke and Rodney Stark and Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace 
of Culture by R. Laurence Moore. Finke and Stark are sociologists at Purdue 
University and the University of Washington, respectively; Moore is an historian 
at Cornell.2 
Both The Churching of America and Selling God employ the market model 
known to economists and sociologists as "rational choice" theory. "Rational 
choice" theory is based on the premise that even in matters of religion people 
make decisions by evaluating costs and benefits and acting so as to maximize 
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those benefits. It assumes that, as a result of rational assessment, people not only 
choose what religion, if any, they will accept, but also how extensively they will 
participate in it.3 
Critics of "rational choice" theory argue that religion should not be examined 
using a marketplace model because it is less rational than those commodities to 
which it would be compared. Which is to say, that the "rational choice" model 
should not be applied to religion because it is different from the profane products 
with which it would then be grouped; that religion is walled off from the 
calculation of utility on which competition within the marketplace relies.4 There 
is basis for such criticism. Nevertheless, by narrowing their focus and limiting 
their goals, Finke and Stark and Moore show that use of "rational choice" theory 
can be effective. 
Both The Churching of America and Selling God reject the Weberian thesis, 
that secularization is an inevitable tendency of modernization, and the more 
recent reformulation of that thesis by Peter Berger, which states that religious 
pluralism, as it results in competition, inevitably weakens the truth of any single 
religious tradition and, therefore, is destructive of religion.5 Instead, they argue 
persuasively that in the United States, at least, pluralism has been good for 
religion, that there has been a congruence between pluralism and religious 
vitality. A World Values Survey, conducted in 1990-1993 and released after 
publication of both books, supports this conclusion. The survey reports that 82 
percent of its respondents in the United States said that they considered them-
selves religious, as compared with 55 in Britain, 54 in western Germany, and 48 
in France. Forty-four percent of Americans said that they attended a religious 
service at least once a week, as compared to 18 in western Germany, 14 in Britain, 
and 10 in France.6 
, The Churching of America and Selling God, however, are also quite differ-
ent. Although it treats historical material and employs historical data, The 
Churching of America is primarily an exercise in the sociology of religion. 
Selling God is first and foremost a history. The Churching of God is concerned 
with winners and losers; Selling God examines the role American religion, as a 
whole, has played in the marketplace of American culture. 
The Churching of America is essentially two books in one—one empirical, 
one theoretical. It presents a compendium of data on religious adherence in the 
United States from the colonial period to the present, and it applies "rational 
choice" theory to that data in an examination of the dynamics of religious bodies 
in the United States as they have sought to attract and hold a committed 
membership. First, Finke and Stark show how the United States has shifted from 
a nation in which in 1776 only 17 percent of its adults took part in organized 
religion to one in which, today, 62 percent participate. They then explain why, 
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in the process, denominations have won and lost. In that regard an equally good 
subtitle for their study might have been: "Why Upstarts Win in America." 
Finke and Stark point to an endless cycle of sect formation, transformation, 
schism, and rebirth in American religious history, in response to the changing 
demands of the consumer. Among the biggest recent winners in the process, 
according to Finke and Stark, have been the Southern Baptists, Assemblies of 
God, the Church of the Nazarene, the Church of God, and Roman Catholics. The 
list of biggest losers includes Episcopalians, Methodists, Congregationalists, 
Presbyterians, and Christians (Disciples). Finke and Stark attribute success to the 
effectiveness with which groups are able to market religious doctrine that appeals 
to the heart rather than the head. Failure, they find, results from doing just the 
opposite, or, commonly, from attempting to join the American mainstream by 
softening their doctrine and demanding less of their adherents. Dean Kelley made 
much the same point nearly twenty-five years ago in Why Conservative Churches 
Are Growing, but he limited his study to conservative religious groups, lacked 
Finke and Stark's historical perspective, and failed to muster anywhere near their 
amount of supporting data.7 
Particularly persuasive in establishing their assessment of winners and losers 
is Finke and Stark's discussion of the period from 1776 to 1850, during which 
time American religious groups were forced (some leaped with glee) into the 
marketplace, producing the first dramatic changes in the American religious 
landscape. While larger, longer established groups (some legally, in the colonial 
period) responded with disdain, "upstart sects" aggressively courted the un-
churched and the fallen away, especially on the frontier. One result was that 
overall rates of religious adherence rose from 17 percent in 1776 to 37 in 1850. 
Another, however, was the increase in market share for Baptists from 16.9 to 20.5 
and for Methodists, from 2.5 to 34.2, while Episcopalians and Congregationalists 
declined from 16 to 3.5 and 20 to 4 percent, respectively.8 
Not surprisingly, Finke and Stark have little use for the fine points of 
theology, which many historians of American religion have employed in explain-
ing the success or failure of particular religious groups. Many of those studies 
assumed a model of intellectual progress, wherein the history of American 
religion was seen as a process of continual refinement toward a more systematic 
theology, and winners were determined by the degree to which they realized that 
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level of refinement. In such studies, mainstream liberal Protestant churches have 
appeared to be most successful, where in Finke and Stark's assessment of gains 
and losses in market share, they have been the biggest losers. 
Finke and Stark criticize historians of American religion for overemphasiz-
ing mainstream Protestant religion and giving insufficient attention to "upstart 
sects." As alluded to earlier, there is much truth in this criticism; it is nevertheless 
ironic in that historian R. Laurence Moore, author of Selling God, has also 
published Religious Outsiders in the Making of America (1986), perhaps the 
finest study on the subject.9 
In Selling God, Moore presents a history of American religion in the 
marketplace of culture from disestablishment in 1791 to the present. He opens 
by reminding us that pluralism may have been a fait accompli in 1791 but that it 
was nonetheless unprecedented and troubling. The nation had already embarked 
on an experiment in republican government, and few believed that that govern-
ment could long endure without those values that only a single religion—one that 
would bind together an already disparate people—could provide. Moore's 
history, much like Finke and Stark's, shows that such fears may have been 
understandable but ultimately needless. American religion has flourished, 
leading Moore to proclaim: "What remains striking is that the two agencies most 
necessary to the course of American democracy, religious denominations and 
political parties, were neither foreseen nor welcome" (87). 
Moore sets two goals for his history. The first is to show that American 
religious leaders, in their attempt to expand their market share of the churchgoing 
population, made effective use of marketplace techniques. The second is to show 
that the involvement of American religious leaders in the cultural marketplace 
was not only successful but also positioned them to deal effectively with 
purveyors of what they feared would become an irreligious and immoral popular 
culture. 
Moore devotes over half of Selling God to his first goal. Religion's role in 
the marketplace of culture, he explains, began in the nineteenth century when, 
rather than merely being critical of the various forms of leisure and entertainment 
available to the public, religious leaders decided to market their own alternatives. 
They began by publishing reading material that, they believed, would instill 
proper values rather than appeal to readers' more basic instincts, and they 
achieved economy of scale by entering into mass publishing ventures. For 
example, by 1829 the American Tract Society had produced over six million 
items, which were appealingly written, inexpensive, and effectively promoted 
through attractive advertising and door-to-door sales. 
Nineteenth century religious leaders soon diversified into other areas of 
popular entertainment. They organized camp meetings with an eye toward 
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providing amusement, as well as religion, for the entire family. In response to the 
increasingly attractive secular theater, they produced plays "full of Christian 
sentiments and morals," and staged them in public places like Central Park. And, 
as tourism began to develop, they organized summer retreats in the country that 
combined moral uplift, education, and relaxation. 
Moore, of course, provides many other examples of the successful marketing 
of religious products, but one of his most useful sections deals with the first few 
decades of the twentieth century, wherein religious leaders most openly and 
unabashedly embraced marketing techniques developed by the leaders of com-
merce. The peak year might have been 1926, when Francis H. Case wrote 
Handbook of Church Advertising. When Case predicted that some would react 
to his book by objecting that religious leaders were "mixing faith with business," 
and then responded that "they must mix if civilization is to endure" (213), 
however, he was only stating what many other church leaders had believed for 
years. It was, Moore explains, American religion's response to Frederick 
Winslow Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management (1911). And, even 
Taylor's seminal work was preceded by Principles of Successful Church Adver-
tising (1908), wherein Charles Stelze urged religious leader to create religious 
products that guaranteed customer satisfaction, and to market those products so 
effectively that people would be convinced that religion was a good choice— 
much like Ivory soap, Campbell's soup, and Pond's beauty lotion. 
Moore is just as persuasive in developing his second point; that is, in showing 
not only that religious leaders were effective in creating alternatives to suspect 
forms of popular entertainment, but also, because they were so successful in that 
endeavor, they were able to persuade purveyors of secular popular culture to run 
their businesses according to guidelines provided by a Protestant moral economy. 
One example will suffice. 
Film, Moore points out, posed the first truly major challenge to the strong 
position held by American religion i n the marketplace of culture—to wit, in 1937, 
weekly box office numbers were three times weekly church attendance. In 
response, American religious leaders marshalled their forces on several different 
fronts. With the nickelodeon's first appearance, they forced producers to exercise 
self-censorship and operators to relocate their theaters from proximity to saloons, 
brothels, and dance halls they originally favored, to more genteel areas. They also 
insisted that their darkened halls be well monitored so as to insure proper patron 
behavior. Later, American religious leaders convinced film makers such as Cecil 
B. De Mille that he could profit from films with religious content, such as The Ten 
Commandments (1923), and pushed the film industry into creating for itself and 
abiding by national film boards of review. (The alternative, religious leaders 
made clear, was agitation for greater censorship.) 
To be effective in the marketplace of culture, religious leaders had to work 
together, overcoming pre-existing levels of divisive parochialism. Finke and 
Stark not only insist that such united fronts as the American Home Missionary 
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Society, in the nineteenth century, and the National Council of Churches, in the 
twentieth, proved detrimental to its participants in that groups entering into such 
alliances soon lost market share, but also that such "religious cartels" or 
"interdenominational front groups," as the authors also term them, were, in 
reality, attempts by larger established churches to muscle out much smaller 
"upstart sects." Moore, in contrast, points out that such "sacred canopies" 
produced products that sold Christianity, broadly speaking, rather than denomi-
national doctrine, and that, regardless of the fate of individual members, they 
were successful in the cultural marketplace. 
It would be easy to criticize Finke and Stark for being reductionist in their 
employment of "rational choice" theory. In fact, they anticipated such criticism, 
so I will resist the temptation and note instead that, although they perhaps have 
overly hyped their findings, Finke and Stark largely achieved what they set out 
to do. 
Finke and Stark are at their best in discussing the rise and fall of the 
Methodists in the United States, as they are among history's biggest winners and 
losers. As noted, Methodists rose from obscurity in 1776 to be the largest 
denomination in the United States in 1850. By the end of the century, however, 
they were overtaken by Baptists and Roman Catholics and, when they ejected 
from their ranks the Holiness Movement, poised to be one the biggest winners of 
the 20th century, they began their descent. Less satisfying is Finke and Stark's 
attempt to force Roman Catholicism into their mold, and their omission of any 
substantive discussion of winners such as Mormons, Pentecostals, and Black 
Baptists. 
And, finally, readers of The Churching of America are likely to be cautious 
in accepting Finke and Stark's use of gains and losses of market share as the 
principal measure of winners and losers. As impressive as it is, it can be 
misleading and may underestimate, or overstate, the remaining, or resulting, 
strength of losers and winners. Methodists, for example, Finke and Stark's 
biggest losers, have lost 48 percent of their market share in the past half century. 
Yet, they continue to be the third largest denomination in the United States (a 
position they have held for nearly a century) with some 64.3 adherents for every 
1000 church members. Compare that to the Church of God, one of Finke and 
Stark's biggest winners, which, in the same half-century, has increased its market 
share 260 percent, but still accounts for only 3.6 adherents per 1000. 
Moore ends on a cautious note. He too recognizes his tendency toward 
reductionism. He admits to a secular bias, and calls himself a "soft determinist" 
(8). He nevertheless acknowledges those who have argued that applications of 
"rational choice" theory are limited by the uniqueness of religion and thatreligion 
is not entirely at home even in the cultural, to say nothing of the commercial, 
marketplace. He realizes the limits of studies such as his that ignore the fine points 
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of theology, and, therefore, stops short of insisting that he has shown a perfect 
correlation between levels of church membership and acceptance of religious 
doctrine. 
And, finally, having effectively argued that American religion has fared well 
in the marketplace of culture, he discusses the limits within which that conclusion 
must be viewed. He preempts his likely critics by acknowledging that American 
religion has sullied its skirts in the marketplace. He agrees with those who have 
argued that despite their increased membership, churches have lost their power 
to enforce moral sanctions, even against their own members. While insisting that 
religion continues to be important to the American people, he allows that they 
have relegated it to its own "time and place," and often refused, or at least failed, 
to apply its teachings to their daily lives. In sum, Moore concludes, having 
successfully competed in the marketplace, it has become a commodity. 
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